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Abstract
A simple open economy asset pricing model can account for the house
price and current account dynamics in the G7 over the years 2001-2008.
The model features rational households, but assumes that households en-
tertain subjective beliefs about price behavior and update these using
Bayes’ rule. The resulting beliefs dynamics considerably propagate eco-
nomic shocks and crucially contribute to replicating the empirical evi-
dence. Belief dynamics can temporarily delink house prices from funda-
mentals, so that low interest rates can fuel a house price boom. House
price booms, however, are not necessarily synchronized across countries
and the model is consistent with the heterogeneous response of house
prices across the G7 following the reduction in real interest rates at the
beginning of the millennium. The response to interest rates depends sen-
sitively on agents’ beliefs at the time of the interest rate reduction, which
in turn are a function of the country specific history prior to the year
2000. According to the model, the US house price boom could have been
largely avoided, if real interest rates had decreased by less after the year
2000.
JEL Class. No: F41, F32, E43
1 Introduction
We present a stylized open economy asset pricing model with rationally investing
households that can quantitatively replicate the house price dynamics in the G7
economies over the years 2001-2008, as well as the associated dynamics of the
current account.
∗We thank Lars Hansen, Michael Woodford and Daron Acemoglu for useful comments.
All errors are our own. Marcet acknowleges funding from Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia
and Generalitat de Catalunya. Contacts: adam@uni-mannheim.de, a.marcet@lse.ac.uk and
pei.kuang@hof.uni-frankfurt.de.
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In our model, boom and bust dynamics in house prices are triggered by
macro-fundamentals, e.g., changes in real interest rates or housing preferences
but, as in the data, the response to these changes in fundamentals can vary
across countries. Also similar to the data, price booms in our model are asso-
ciated with an expansion of the housing stock, a deterioration of the current
account, and a consumption boom, while the subsequent house price declines
are accompanied by current account improvements and subdued consumption.
To study the relationship between house price movements, housing construc-
tion, consumption and international borrowing, we generalize the closed econ-
omy asset pricing models developed previously in Adam and Marcet (2010, 2011)
and Adam Marcet and Nicolini (2010) along three dimensions. First, we con-
sider a setting with two assets, namely a domestically traded risky asset -
the housing stock - and an internationally traded riskless bond. Second, we
newly incorporate a borrowing constraint that limits household leverage and
the overall amount of borrowing, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Third,
we consider a production economy with endogenous asset supply by explicitly
incorporating a construction sector. Despite these extensions our model is rel-
atively parsimonious.
The quantitative success of the model crucially rests on the assumption that
we allow for households that are uncertain about how house prices relate to
economic fundamentals. Our households are thus at par with academic econo-
mists who appear to be equally uncertain about the right model governing asset
prices. We incorporate this feature by putting to work the concept of ‘internal
rationality’, as developed previously in Adam and Marcet (2010, 2011). Inter-
nally rational investors are utility maximizers in the standard sense and enter-
tain fully specified and dynamically consistent beliefs about all payoff-relevant
variables that are external to them (including competitive market prices). In-
ternally rational agents, however, do not fully understand how market prices
are formed, so that their subjective probability distribution about prices may
not be exactly equal to the true equilibrium distribution. Agents nevertheless
have a very good understanding of how to predict prices. First, their beliefs
about prices are near-rational in the sense that they are assumed to be close
to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) beliefs typically attributed to
agents in the literature. Second, the model that agents entertain about price
behavior is validated by actual data, in the sense that it would be accepted by a
standard testing procedure using actual data. Third, agents’ house price model
is validated by the outcome of the asset pricing model itself, in the sense that it
would be rejected by an econometric test only as frequently as a model yielding
rational expectations (RE).
Given agents’ subjective uncertainty about price, optimal behavior implies
that they update beliefs about house price behavior by applying Bayes’ rule
to market outcomes. Agents’ price beliefs thus become a state variable and
(Bayesian) learning gives rise to a dynamic feedback between price beliefs and
actual price outcomes. As we show, this generates a considerable amount of
additional propagation and can fuel boom and bust dynamics in house prices,
i.e., price dynamics that temporarily delink asset prices from their fundamental
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value. This is of interest because the momentum in house price changes that can
be observed in the data has proven difficult to explain with the help of rational
expectations models, see Glaeser and Gyourko (2006). Therefore, Glaeser et
al. (2008) previously suggested that models of learning can help resolving this
empirical puzzle.
Learning about price dynamics turns out to be important for explaining the
persistent rise and fall in house prices occurring over the years 2001-2008 in
the G7. Our model thereby suggests that the strong fall in real interest rates
after the year 2000 contributed significantly to the subsequent housing boom
in some of the G7 economies. In line with the empirical evidence, however, the
model predicts that these movements are not necessarily synchronized across
countries. While some G7 countries experienced house price booms (US, UK,
Canada, Italy, France), they did so to very different degrees, and other coun-
tries (Japan, Germany) even displayed stagnant house prices over this period.
The model successfully replicates this heterogeneity because the predicted house
price evolution is highly dependent on agents’ price beliefs at the time of the
interest rate reduction, which in turn depend on the behavior of house prices in
the respective economies prior to the fall in the real rate.
Our learning model is also compatible with observed house price expecta-
tions. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use the Michigan Survey of Consumers to
document that the share of agents believing prices to increase further comoves
positively with the house price level over the last housing boom. Specifically,
the share of optimistic agents reached its peak precisely at the time when house
prices peaked. This fact is consistent with the learning we propose and difficult
to reconcile with rational expectations.
The paper also suggests important policy lessons. Since the world interest
rate is an exogenous parameter in the model, we can study the effects of alter-
native interest rate scenarios. For the U.S. economy the model predicts that the
recent US house price boom would have been largely avoided, and the current
account deficit would have been considerably smaller, if interest rates had fallen
by less at the beginning of the 2000’s. Although such a link between real in-
terest rates and house price booms is frequently discussed in the press1, to the
best of our knowledge we present the first formal model in which a sizable and
persistent house price boom can arise from a persistent reduction in the level of
real interest rates.2
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature on house price fluctuations and current account dynamics. Section 3
presents stylized facts we seek to explain about the behavior of house prices, the
current account and private consumption in the G7. Section 4 introduces a styl-
ized open economy model, derives the household optimality conditions and the
equations determining the equilibrium outcomes for a general set of subjective
1E.g., The Economist (August 23, 2007): ’Does America need a recession?’, Economic
Focus.
2Himmelberg et al. (2005) show that with low real interest rates a further reduction in
rates can give rise to a large house price increase under rational expectations. It fails, however,
to give rise to a persistent sequence of house price increases.
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price beliefs. In section 5 we show that the model has difficulties in replicating
salient features of the data under rational expectations (RE). Section 6 intro-
duces subjective price beliefs that are close to the REE beliefs (in distribution)
and learning about house price behavior. In section 7 we show how the learn-
ing model can qualitatively account for the observed dynamics in house prices,
current accounts and consumption in the G7. Sections 8 and 9 then explore the
quantitative model performance. Finally, section 10 shows that learning agents
who are confronted with the model generated house price outcomes would re-
ject their model of house price behavior approximately only as often as a model
yielding rational expectations. A conclusion briefly summarizes.
2 Related Literature
Relatively few papers study house price dynamics within dynamic equilibrium
models before the recent recession. Important exceptions are Iacoviello (2005),
who develops a monetary business cycle model with housing and collateral con-
straints, and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005) who study the role of house
prices and housing collateral for the pricing of stocks.
Some recent papers use models of learning to explain observed house price
data. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), for example, present a model
in which a temporary house price boom emerges from infectious optimism that
eventually dissipates once investors become increasingly certain about funda-
mentals. Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) present a model in which aggregate
wealth fluctuates because agents learn about the expected future productivity
of capital goods. Positive news about future productivity is shown to generate
an increase in asset prices, a consumption boom and a current account deficit.
The small volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals, however, poses problem
for such news driven explanations of asset price fluctuations.
Other papers also account for some of the empirical features that we de-
scribe. Matsuyama (1990) provides a theoretical analysis of the income effect of
government spending, housing subsidies and sector-specific productivity change
on residential investment and the current account. He shows that anticipated
government spending shocks lead to a decline in house prices and residential
investment, but that the effect on the current account depends on whether
housing and nondurable consumption are substitutes or complements. Punzi
(2006) evaluates the quantitative impact of the housing market on the current
account using a two-sector, two-country DSGE model with heterogenous agents
and a housing collateral constraint. In her setup, housing preference shocks gen-
erate a negative correlation between house prices and the current account. Gete
(2010) seeks to explain current account and housing price dynamics through
cross-country heterogeneity in the evolution of housing demand. If the desire
to smooth consumption across housing services and nondurable consumption
goods is strong or if households’ preferences feature low intra-temporal substi-
tution elasticity, then an increase in housing demand can give rise to a house
price increase and a current account deficit.
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Figure 1: United State: House Price Measures and the Current Account
3 Stylized Facts
3.1 U.S. House Prices and the Current Account 1996-2008
A variety of house price measures indicate that house prices in the United States
increased considerably over the years 1996-2006. Figure 1 depicts indices of the
real house price (RHP), the price-to-income (PIR) ratio, and the price-to-rent
(PRR) ratio normalizing indices to a value of 100 in the year 1996.3 Prices
increased - depending on the preferred house price measure - between 24% and
58% in the subsequent 10 years. While house prices started increasing well
before the year 2000, all house price measures indicate that over 70% of the
total increase takes place after the year 2000.
Figure 1 also depicts the U.S. current account deficit (in % of GDP).4 The
current account and the house price are strongly negatively associated over time,
with the deficit widening considerably throughout the period 1996 - 2006, except
for a slight and temporary improvement in the recession year 2001. Once house
prices started to revert direction in the years 2007 and 2008, however, the U.S.
current account deficit also started to narrow, a development that accelerated
in the year 2009 (see the current account data in table 1 below).
Table 1 below reports the annual change in the value of the U.S. housing
stock (at market prices), together with the size of the current account deficit.5
3The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Tables 59 and
60. The real house price index is the nominal house price index deflated by CPI price index.
4The data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Table 51.
5The change in housing value is computed using the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds
Statistics, Table B.100, Release 2010-12-9. The current account numbers are taken from NIPA
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The bottom row in the table reveals that in the period 1996-2005, any 1$ increase
in the value of the U.S. housing stock was on average associated with a 0.26$
increase in international borrowing in the form of a current account deficit. This
relationship is remarkably stable over these years (the standard deviation is just
0.04) but changes after the year 2006 when current account deficits improve
only mildly, despite the domestic housing value either increasing less strongly
(in 2006) or decreasing substantially (after 2007).
Yea r : 9 6 9 7 9 8 9 9 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9
Va lu e ch a n g e
U .S . h o u s e s t o ck + 0 .4 + 0 .5 + 0 .9 + 1 .0 + 1 .7 + 1 .4 + 1 .3 + 1 .7 + 2 .6 + 3 .5 + 1 .0 -1 .7 -3 .8 - 0 .8
( v s p r e v . y e a r ,
t r n d o l la r s )
U .S . C A d efi c i t 1 1 4 1 2 9 2 0 5 2 9 2 4 1 0 3 9 2 4 5 2 5 1 6 6 2 5 7 4 1 7 9 8 7 1 7 6 7 0 3 8 0
(b n d o l la r s )
C A d efi c i t / ch . 0 .2 7 0 .2 4 0 .2 2 0 .2 8 0 .2 5 0 .2 8 0 .3 4 0 .3 0 0 .2 3 0 .2 1 0 .8 4 -0 .4 1 -0 .1 8 -0 .4 5
in h o u s e va lu e
Table 1: U.S. Housing Value Appreciation and the Current Account
3.2 U.S.: Real Rates, Consumption, and Construction
The house price and current account developments in the U.S. highlighted in the
previous section were accompanied by a number of other broad macroeconomic
trends that we now describe. We thereby focus on three variables, namely the
behavior of real interest rates, private consumption and construction activity
The acceleration of the U.S. house price increase and the widening of current
account deficits after the years 2000/2001 coincided with a considerable fall in
ex-ante real interest rates. Figure 2 illustrates this fact by depicting the one
year adjustable mortgage rate subtracting from it the median expected 1 year
ahead CPI inflation rate from the survey of professional forecasters.6 The figure
shows that ex-ante real interest rates considerably dropped around the beginning
of the year 2001 and stayed low for an extended period of time, before rising
again around the year 2006. Overall, real interest rates display considerably
less persistence than real house prices. While real interest rates completed a
full cycle over the years 1996-2006, house prices steadily increased throughout
this period. It thus appears far from immediate to establish a close link between
house prices and real interest rates in the data.
tables, as downloaded through the FRB St. Louis FRED database.
6The mortgage rate is the ’1-year adjustable rate mortgage average in the United States’
from Freddie Mac (SeriesID: MORTGAGE1US).
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Figure 2: United States: Ex-Ante Real Mortgage Rate
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Figure 3: United States: House Price Changes and Consumption Growth
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Figure 4: United States: House Prices and New Housing Completions
To capture the interest rate evolution in a stylized way, we consider three
subperiods: a period with relatively high real rates over the years 1996-2000, a
period with relatively low real rates over the years 2001-2005, and a period of
moderately high rates in the years 2006-2008. The horizontal lines in figure 2
indicate the average interest rate for each of these subperiods.
Figure 3 depicts real private consumption growth together with various mea-
sures of house price growth.7 Private consumption expanded over the years
1996-2006 by more than 3% each year, but came down after house prices re-
verted direction in 2007 and 2008. As has been documented before, there is
thus a positive association between house price and consumption growth in the
data.
The number of new houses built in the U.S. also strongly expanded over the
period 1996-2006. Figure 4 reports the number of new housing units completed
in the U.S. together with various house price measures.8 The figure shows that
the level of house prices and the number of housing completions are strongly
positively correlated.
3.3 Cross-Sectional Evidence from G7 Economies
The facts documented for the U.S. Economy in the previous section, appear in
similar form in the cross section of G7 economies.9
7The real private consumption growth data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No.87,
2010, Annex Table 3. The house price series employ the same data as used for figure 1.
8The housing units data is from U.S. Census Bureau, using the series ’new privately owned
housing units completed’. The house price series are the same as the ones shown in figure 1.
9Data limitations prevent us from discussing the behavior of new housing construction or
the relationship between value changes of the housing stock and the current account for all
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Figure 5: Real House Prices in the G7 (Indices, Normalized to 100 in Year 2000)
Table 2 below shows that over the period 2001-2007 house price increases
and current account surpluses are negatively correlated in the cross-section of
G7 countries.10 Countries with larger house price booms thus tended to have
also larger current account deficits. This holds independently of the considered
house price measure (RHP, PIR, PRR). Furthermore, house price increases are
strongly positively correlated with real private consumption growth over the
same period, showing that countries with larger house price booms also tended
to have larger consumption booms. Finally, as shown in table 3, the house price
reversals in 2007-2008 are similarly strongly negatively correlated with changes
in the current account surplus. These cross-sectional relationships are consistent
with the correlation over time that can observed for U.S. data.
Although the G7 evidence confirms the comovements between house price,
current account and consumption dynamics documented for the U.S., there
exists a considerable amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity across the G7
economies. Figure 5 illustrates this fact by depicting the real house price indices
for the G7 economies, normalizing the house price indices to 100 for the year
2000.11 It is clear that house prices show high volatility and high persistence in
all countries. Table 4 documents the latter fact by reporting the average serial
correlation of housing prices over time across the G7 countries.
Importantly, however, the large low frequency movements in house prices
G7 countries.
10Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) also provide evidence on the strong positive association
between current account deficits and the appreciation of real estate prices across a number of
countries.
11The figure looks very similar when depicting instead the the price-to-rent ratio or the
price-to-income ratio.
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are not synchronized across countries. While four countries experienced sus-
tained and even larger house price increases after 2000 than the U.S., Japan
and Germany witnessed real price decreases.
Current Account Real Priv. Cons.
Surplus Increase
House Price (2001-07, cum. sum (2001-2007,
Change 2001-07 in % of GDP) cum. sum in % )
Real house price -0.55 0.72
Price-rent ratio -0.42 0.75
Price-income ratio -0.52 0.61
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Correlations in the G7
Change in Current Account Surplus
2008 vs. 2007
House Price Change 2007-2008 (in % of GDP)
Real house -0.75
Price—rent ratio -0.90
Price-income ratio -0.83
Table 3: Cross-Sectional Correlations in the G7
10
G7 average autocorrelation
1996-2008
House Prices Measure
real house prices 0.98
price-to-rent ratio 0.97
price-to-income 0.97
Table 4: Autocorrelation of G7 House Prices
4 An Open Economy Model with Housing
This section presents a parsimonious open economy model with endogenous
housing supply in which households can internationally borrow for consump-
tion and investment purposes. Household borrowing is thereby subject to a
collateral-based borrowing constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Preferences and Beliefs. We consider an economy populated by a unit
mass of utility maximizing households. Households are identical in terms of
preferences and beliefs - a fact that is not known to agents12 - with the repre-
sentative household maximizing
EP0
∞X
t=0
δt (ξtht + ct) (1)
where ct ≥ 0 denotes consumption of goods, ht ≥ 0 consumption of housing
services, δ ∈ (0, 1) the time discount factor, and ξt > 0 a housing preference
shock. We assume that the preference shock evolves according to
ln ξt = ln ξt−1 + ln εt (2)
with εt being an iid innovation satisfying E[ln εt] = 0 and E[(ln εt)
2
] = σ2ε. The
preference shock ξt captures changes in the population’s preferences for housing
services relative to consumption. As we argue below, the assumed unit root
specification is broadly consistent with the available data.
The household’s expectation in (1) is computed using a (potentially subjec-
tive) probability measure P, which is defined over the space of payoff-relevant
12As explained in Adam and Marcet (2011), common knowledge of agents’ preferences and
beliefs might place additional restrictions on the house price beliefs that rational agents can
entertain, so we need to assume absence of common knowledge.
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outcomes Ω. The measure P assigns probabilities to all subsets of Ω in a sigma-
algebra B, so that agents entertain a standard probability space (P,B,Ω). Im-
portantly, the set Ω includes all sequences of payoff-relevant variables that agents
take as given. This includes fundamental shocks, but also competitive market
prices. Agents’ choices in a given period t are then functions of the realization
of these payoff-relevant variables up to t. While the measure P itself is time-
invariant, i.e., dynamically consistent, it will often imply that rational agents
are learning about the house price process. This is the case, for example, if P
is generated by a model that agents entertain about the stochastic process of
house prices and by some prior beliefs about unknown parameters describing
this process. Further details about the underlying probability space are given
in section 4.1 below.
Budget Constraint and Collateral Constraint. We let Ht ≥ 0 denote
the stock of houses owned by the household in period t. The housing stock
yields housing services ht according to
ht = G(Ht) (3)
for some twice continuously differentiable and (weakly) concave function G(·)
satisfying the conditions limH→0G0(H) = ∞ and limH→H G0(H) = −∞ for
some H ≤ ∞. We impose this latter condition for technical convenience: it
insures the existence of an optimal house holding plan for all beliefs about house
prices satisfying the restriction that house prices cannot become negative. The
above assumptions imply that there is a bliss point HB such that G0(HB) = 0;
with the additional assumption that this bliss point is unique we have G0(H) ≥ 0
forH < HB and G0(H) ≤ 0 forH > HB. For reasons that will become apparent
below, the housing stock may exceed this bliss point in equilibrium.
Using the consumption good as numeraire and letting qt denote the price of
houses, the agent’s flow budget constraint is
ct + (Ht − (1− d)Ht−1) qt +Rbt−1 + kt = yt + bt + πt + kt−1pt (4)
where yt ≥ 0 denotes an exogenous income process, bt the household’s new
loans, R the gross real interest rate on maturing loans bt−1, d ∈ [0, 1) the rate
at which the housing stock depreciates, πt profits from the ownership of (housing
development) firms, and kt ≥ 0 capital sold to competitive housing developers
who use this capital as an input for the production of new houses. This capital
stock fully depreciates in one period. To capture time lags in housing production
and for simplicity we assume that the price pt remunerating kt−1 is a competitive
forward price that is fixed in period t− 1.
For notational simplicity we do not introduce a competitive market for hous-
ing services ht. While the analysis would remain unchanged with such a market,
it would imply that the competitive market for housing services is given by ξt.
For this reason we interpret ξt as the rental price for housing in the remaining
part of the paper. And to show that our unit root assumption for log ξt is indeed
reasonable, table 5 below reports the Dickey-Fuller test statistics for a unit root
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model with drift based on the log of the rental rate for housing in the respective
countries.13 For the considered sample, the 10% critical value for this statistic
is -2.614, which is far from any of the reported test statistics. This suggests
that our stochastic specification for ξt is indeed reasonable.
US JAP GER FR UK CAN
t -statistic -0.921 -0.848 -0.383 0.131 0.696 -0.162
Table 5: Dickey-Fuller Test for Assumed ξt Process
We assume that consumers’ borrowing is subject to a collateral constraint
of the form
bt ≤ θ
EPt qt+1
R
Ht (5)
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1−d] captures the share
of houses owned by the household today that can serve as collateral to lenders,
this parameter is assumed fixed. A value of θ < 1 thereby incorporates the
effects of physical depreciation of houses, as well as the possibility that seizing
the collateral in case of default is costly for lenders.
The borrowing constraint (5) will be key to understand the model-implied
relation between house prices and current account dynamics. In a situation
where actual and expected prices tend to grow, the borrowing constraint will be
relatively loose. Agents can thus increase international borrowing when house
prices grow, thereby establishing a connection between house price booms and
current account deficits.14
We assume that there is a sufficiently wealthy risk neutral international
lender which holds the same beliefs P as domestic agents. The international
lender has a time discount rate R−1 which we assume to satisfy R−1 ∈ (δ, 1).
The latter implies that the international lender is more patient than domestic
households. In addition to simplifying the analysis, it captures the presence of
China and other emerging economies as large and patient international lenders
in the global economy. We also assume that the market for collateralized loans is
internationally fully integrated. With these assumptions, the world equilibrium
interest rate for collateralized loans is given by R.15
13The data is from the OECD, using a sample spanning the years 1970-2008. Italy is
excluded because the rental data is only available from 1996 onwards. The regression used in
the Dickey Fuller test is based on the model log ξt = α+ρ log ξt−1+εt, and the null hypothesis
α = 0, ρ = 1 is tested against the alternative α 6= 0 and ρ < 1. The reported statistic is the
estimate for ρ− 1 divided by its estimated standard deviation.
14Using current houses prices instead of expected future prices in the borrowing constraint
(5) would make virtually no difference for our purposes, as actual and expected prices tend
to move together in the learning model we consider.
15 It is easy to rule out interest rates below R as then domestic and foreign agents both
wish to borrow, implying that the loan market cannot clear. For interest rates above R
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Housing Supply. We now turn to the determinants of housing supply.
There exists a competitive housing development sector consisting of a unit mass
of housing development firms. The representative firm operates a decreasing
returns to scale technology for constructing new houses. The amount of new
housing produced at t is given by
(αδ)−1 kαt−1
with kt−1 ≥ 0 denoting the amount of development capital used by housing
developers and α ∈ (0, 1). To capture time lags in housing construction we
assume that firms choose the level of input kt−1 in period t− 1, i.e., one period
in advance.
Firms in the housing sector are owned by the consumer in the small open
economy, who receive profits as lump sum transfers. Since firms do not have a
true intertemporal maximization problem (there is no state variable in the firms’
problem), we can assume that they maximize expected profits from housing
construction by choosing16
max
kt−1≥0
EPt−1
µ
1
αδ
kαt−1qt − ptkt−1
¶
where pt is the price of period t inputs purchased from households in period
t − 1 in a competitive forward market. The profit-maximizing input choice is
given by
k∗t−1 =
µ
EPt−1qt
δpt
¶ 1
1−α
and determines a supply function for new houses of the form
S(EPt−1qt, pt) =
1
αδ
µ
EPt−1qt
δpt
¶ α
1−α
(6)
with α1−α denoting the elasticity of housing supply with respect to the expected
selling price EPt−1qt. The housing stock then evolves according to
Ht = (1− d)Ht−1 + S(EPt−1qt, pt) (7)
and developers’ realized profits in period t are given by
πt =
1
αδ
µ
EPt−1qt
δpt
¶ α
1−α
qt − pt
µ
EPt−1qt
δpt
¶ 1
1−α
(8)
the foreign lender wishes to borrow up to its borrowing constraint. If the foreign agent is
sufficiently wealthy, this would lead to a violation of the non-negativity constraint on domestic
consumption. It thus has to be the case that the interest rate equals R. Provided the foreign
lender is sufficiently wealthy, lending to domestic agents will imply non-negative consumption
for the foreign lender.
16As should become from section 4.1 below, one should use a slightly different belief sys-
tem for firms than used for consumers because profits are a choice variable for firms, while
consumers take profits as given. Since this does not affect the expectations showing up in the
subsequent firm optimality conditions, we ignore this issue in the text.
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4.1 The Underlying Probability Space
We now describe details of the underlying probability space (P,B,Ω). The
probability space is entirely standard from viewpoint of probability theory, but
will be extended (or more general) when compared to the approach taken in the
RE literature. Specifically, we define the state space of outcomes as
Ω ≡ Ωp ×Ωq ×Ωξ ×Ωy ×Ωπ
where ΩX =
Q∞
t=0R+ is the space of possible infinite sequences for the variable
X ∈ {p, q, ξ, y, π}. We thus do not restrict attention to the history of ‘fundamen-
tal’ or exogenous variables (ξ, y), instead include all sequences of payoff-relevant
variables that agents take as given in their decision problem. This includes prices
and profits, in addition to the ‘fundamental’ variables.
The set of all possible histories up to period t for some variable X is then
denoted by ΩtX , and its typical element X
t ∈ ΩtX , except for p where Ωtp denotes
histories up to t+1. Furthermore, we let Ωt = Ωtp×Ωtq×Ωtξ×Ωty×Ωtπ denote the
set of histories of all exogenous variables up to period t, and ωt ∈ Ωt its typical
element. B is the sigma-algebra of all Borel subsets of Ω and P a measure on
this sigma-algebra. The probability space (P,B,Ω) is assumed common to all
agents, including firms, domestic consumers and foreign agents.
The previous setup implies that agents can condition their decisions on the
history of all observed realizations, i.e., consumers choose for each t
(ct, ht,Ht, bt, kt) : Ωt → R5 . (9)
Conditioning on all observed realizations will be optimal whenever agents do not
know how a given history of fundamentals (y, ξ)t maps into outcomes for prices
and profits. This differs from a RE setting where prices (pt, qt) and profits πt
are known functions of the history of fundamentals, implying that conditioning
also on the history of prices and profits would simply be redundant.
Agents express their uncertainty about the joint distribution of prices and
fundamentals using the probability measure P. In the spirit of studying small
deviations from rational expectations, we will specify below a probability mea-
sure P that is close - but not exactly equal - to the rational expectations equi-
librium beliefs.
4.2 Household Optimality Conditions
We now derive the conditions characterizing optimal household behavior. We
thereby proceed by assuming that a maximum for the household problem ex-
ists.17 First order conditions are then necessary and sufficient for household
optimality because the objective function is concave and the constraints are
linear in the households’ choices.
17Existence of a maximum can be insured, for example, by imposing that the utility from
consumption (ct) is bounded at some very high level. See Appendix A.1 in Adam and Marcet
(2011) for how this can be achieved in a related model.
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Households maximize the objective (1) subject to the constraints (3), (4)
and (5). Taking explicitly into account the non-negativity constraints for ct and
kt, the Lagrangian of the household problem is given by
max
{ct,Ht,bt,kt}
EP0
∞X
t=0
δt
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ξtG(Ht) + ct
−λt
µ
ct + (Ht − (1− d)Ht−1) qt + bt−1R
+kt − yt − bt − πt − kt−1pt
¶
+γt(θEPt qt+1Ht −Rbt)
+μtct + κtkt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where H−1, k−1 and b−1 are given initial conditions and the prices {qt, pt} , R
are given.
The household’s first order conditions (FOCs) are
ct : λt = 1 + μt with μt ≥ 0 & ctμt = 0 (10)
Ht : ξtG
0(Ht)− λtqt + δ(1− d)EPt λt+1qt+1 + γtθEPt qt+1 = 0 (11)
bt : λt = δREPt λt+1 + γtR with γt ≥ 0
&
¡
θEPt qt+1Ht −Rbt
¢
γt = 0 (12)
kt : λt = δpt+1EPt λt+1 + κt with κt ≥ 0 & ktκt = 0 (13)
for all t ≥ 0. Equation (10) implies that λt ≥ 1.
We now describe the evolution of the equilibrium variables. In the main text
we thereby focus on the case where the non-negativity constraint for ct is not
binding for all t ≤ T + 1, where T denotes the sample size.18 Since R < 1δ the
optimal solution then implies that the consumer will optimally borrow as much
as possible, so that the collateral constraint is binding in each period t ≤ T .
Then, provided the fluctuations in house prices and house price expectations
are not too large, the non-negativity constraint for consumption will indeed not
be violated.19 In this case, μt = 0 for all t = 0, ..., T so that the FOC (10) is
satisfied for λt = 1 and the FOC (12) holds for
γt =
1
R
− δ > 0
for all t = 0, ..., T . Using these results and equation (11) one obtains
qt = ρEPt qt+1 + ξtG
0(Ht) (14)
where
ρ ≡ δ(1− d− θ) + θ
R
< 1 (15)
Given qt and EPt qt+1, equation (14) determines the optimal amount of houses
demanded by the household. Since G0(·) continuously varies between +∞ and
18A full characterization of optimal outcomes is found in appendix A. Since zero consump-
tion does not accord well with the data, this approach appears justified.
19Although a large drop in the expected future house price may imply that loans have to
be repaid to an extend that consumption would have to become negative, we consider values
of the shocks for which this does not occur for the T + 1 periods in our simulations.
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−∞, this equation always has a solution for the optimal housing stock Ht > 0,
for any given pair (qt, EPt qt+1).
Importantly, for qt < ρ EPt qt+1, equation (14) implies G
0(Ht) < 0, so that
housing demand exceeds the bliss point level HB. If houses are expected to
appreciate sufficiently strongly, it can become individually optimal to purchase
housing above the bliss point since housing investment generates capital gains
and relaxes the household’s borrowing constraint.
When the collateral constraint is binding in the first T + 1 periods, the
optimal level of borrowing follows from the binding collateral constraint and is
given by
btR = θEPt qt+1Ht (16)
The capital offered by the consumer to housing developers is only restricted to
satisfy
(1− δpt+1) kt = 0
so that either pt = δ−1 or kt = 0. If the non-negativity constraint on k is
non-binding, the agent is indifferent between consuming today and increasing
by one unit the capital sold to firms in exchange for δ−1 units of consumption
tomorrow. Since firms’ production function implies that firms always have a
positive demand for k, market clearing occurs at
pt = δ−1 (17)
with kt being determined by firms’ demand function.
Finally, consumption can be obtained residually from the flow budget
ct = yt + bt + πt − (Ht − (1− d)Ht−1) qt − bt−1R− kt + kt−1δ−1 (18)
where we imposed (17).
4.3 Equilibrium Dynamics for General Beliefs P
For arbitrary and given beliefs P, the equilibrium evolution of the house price
qt and the housing stock Ht must satisfy equations (14) and (7), rewritten here
as
qt = ρEPt qt+1 + ξtG
0(Ht) (19)
Ht+1 = (1− d)Ht + S(EPt qt+1, δ−1) (20)
These equations can be solved for the process {qt,Ht}∞t=0. Borrowing then
follows from equation (16), housing supply from (6), profits from (8) and equi-
librium consumption from (18).
5 Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
We now assume rational expectations (EPt [·] = Et[·]) and determine the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) for the case where the non-negativity constraint
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on consumption is never binding. We first find the deterministic steady state,
then analyze the effects of preference and income shocks, and finally discuss the
effects of changes in international real interest rates. As will become clear from
the discussion below, under RE the model has great difficulties in replicating
the observed house price dynamics.
5.1 Deterministic Steady State
We start out by determining the deterministic steady state, i.e., the REE in
which ξt = ξ and yt = y for all t. Letting variables without time subscripts
denote steady outcomes, equations (19) and (20) imply
qss =
ξG0(Hss)
1− ρ (21)
Hss =
1
αδd
(qss)
α
1−α (22)
which jointly determine a unique steady state value for qss and Hss.20 Steady
state capital, borrowing and consumption are given by
kss = (qss)
1
1−α
bss = θ
qssHss
R
css = y + θ
µ
1
R
− 1
¶
qssHss − (qss)
1
1−α
5.2 Stochastic Equilibrium: Linear Approximation
We now analyze the effects of shocks to housing preferences ξt and household
income yt. In the interest of deriving closed form approximate solutions, we first
consider solutions to equations (19) and (20) when the function G(·) is linearized
around its steady state. This simplifies the analysis because it allows using
results previously derived in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010) to describe the
model behavior under learning. We consider a concave function G(·) separately
below.
Substituting G0(Ht) by G0(Hss) in equation (19) implies that the REE house
price to rent ratio is (approximately) given by
qREt
ξt
=
G0(Hss)
1− ρ (23)
so that log house price growth evolves according to
ln
qREt
qREt−1
= ln 1 + ln εt (24)
20Existence and uniqueness follow from the following considerations. Equation (21) defines
q as a continuous and (weakly) decreasing function of H which approaches +∞ as H → 0 and
−∞ as H → H. From (22) we have that q is a strictly increasing function of H. As a result
there exist a unique intersection.
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For the linear approximation we thus have EtqREt+1 = qREt and pt = δ
−1, so that
the housing stock approximately evolves according to:21
HREt+1 = (1− d)HREt +
1
αδ
¡
qREt
¢ α
1−α
The previous findings show that preference and income shocks both fail to affect
the price-to-rent ratio (23) and that the real house price follows a unit root
in this approximate REE. With rational expectations, preference and income
shocks thus cannot explain the large swings in the price-to-rent ratio and are
unlikely to explain the persistent boom and bust patterns in real house prices
observed in the data.
5.3 Stochastic Equilibrium: Linear-Quadratic Approxima-
tion
While the linear approximation considered in the previous section is convenient,
assuming linearity of G(·) violates our basic assumptions required to guarantee
existence of an equilibrium. We therefore consider a model with a concave
G(·) in all subsequent computations, but use the linear approximation from
the previous section for intuitive explanations. Appendix B shows that with a
linear-quadratic approximation to G(·), the REE dynamics evolve according to
bqt = aREbξt + bRE bHtbHt+1 = cRE bHt + dREbξt
where hatted variables denote deviations from the steady state and
¡
aRE, bRE, cRE, dRE
¢
are given coefficients satisfying aRE > 0, bRE < 0, 0 < cRE < 1 and dRE > 0.
Importantly, preference shocks still cannot explain the observed house price
dynamics. A positive innovation to the rental price ξt increases the rental price
on impact, but leads to a reduction of the equilibrium price in the subsequent
period.22 The model will thus have difficulties with generating a persistent
increase of the house price. Furthermore, the previous equation imply that the
stock of housing and the price-to-rent ratio move in opposite directions. This
is intuitive, since the price-to-rent ratio qt/ξt is equal to the discounted sum of
future G0 and a higher housing stock H reduces the value of G0. This feature of
the rational expectations model is also hard to reconcile with the data, where the
price-to-rent ratio and the stock of houses display strong positive comovement.
5.4 Calibration, House Prices and Real Interest Rates
We now analyze the effects of unexpected changes in the real interest rate for
the REE house price. As equation (23) shows, a reduction in real interest rates
generates an increase in the real house price and in the price-to-rent ratio. As
21The subsequent equation reveals that sufficiently small housing perference shocks will
indeed imply that Ht stays in the neighborhood of H with high likelihood, as initially assumed.
22The former follows from aRE > 0 and the latter from dRE > 0 and bRE < 0.
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Figure 6: RE Real House Price Dynamics (Stylized Real Rate from Figure 2)
we document below, however, it is unlikely that changes in real interest rates
can properly account for the observed house price dynamics.
To analyze the effects of real interest rate changes we assume that the econ-
omy starts from a steady state position in the year 2000. We then subject it
to the stylized changes in the real interest rate indicated by the dashed line in
figure 2. Specifically, we consider a persistent and unexpected decrease in the
real rate in the year 2001, followed by an equally unexpected real rate increase
in the year 2006.23 The effects of anticipated real rate changes will be discussed
separately below.
The remaining model parameters are calibrated as follows. We set θ = 0.26,
which is the 1996-2005 average of the annual value change change in the U.S.
housing stock over the current account deficit, see table 1. For the annual
discount factor we choose δ = 0.96, so that the discount factor is slightly below
the real interest rate path that we feed into the model.24 We set the annual
house depreciation rate equal to d = 3%.
To illustrate the effects of interest rate changes we abstract from uncertainty
about preference shocks: we set ξt = ξ and normalize ξG0(H) such that the
initial steady state real house price in the year 2000 (prior to any change in the
23The initial real interest rate is set equal to the average ex-ante gross real mortgage rate over
the periods 1996-2000, i.e., R96−00 = 1.0335. In the year 2001 we then consider an expected
and permanent fall in the real interest rate that lasts for 5 years to a value of R01−05 = 1.0228,
which is equal to the average ex-ante U.S. real mortgage rate for this period. Thereafter, we
consider an unexpected and permanent upward shift in real rates to R06−08 = 1.0301, which
is again taken from the data.
24This is required to insure optimality of the binding collateral constraint.
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real interest rate) is equal to 100. Finally, for reasons that will become clear
later on, we choose a value for the constant second derivative G00 so that there
is a small amount of curvature, i.e., we set −G00HssG0 = 0.007. None of the results
shown below proves particularly sensitive to the assumed parameter values.
The resulting REE real house price dynamics from unexpected changes in
the interest rate are illustrated by the upper line in figure 6.25 The figure reveals
that RE imply that house price changes occur simultaneously with unanticipated
changes in real interest rates.26 For the U.S. economy, however, one cannot find
a close simultaneous association between changes in the real mortgage rates
and house prices changes. Mortgage rates, for example, stayed approximately
constant between the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2005, see figure 2,
while house prices increased strongly over these two years. Likewise, real mort-
gage rates were roughly constant over the years 2006-2008, while house prices
decreased considerably over these years. Due to this close association with in-
terest rates, house prices under RE do not exhibit the persistence that can be
observed for house price fluctuations in the data.
Furthermore, the amplitude of the fluctuations generated by interest rate
shocks tends to be small compared to the data. The RE model justifies a
4% appreciation between 2000 and 2005, while the U.S. experienced a tenfold
increase over this period. From a RE viewpoint, it thus appears difficult to
account for the observed house price dynamics using changes in real interest
rates as a driving force.
Even greater difficulties arise if one assumes instead that agents fully antic-
ipate future changes in real interest rates, instead of assuming that any given
change is considered permanent. If agents anticipate the 2006 real interest rate
increase, then house prices evolve according to the lower line shown in figure
6. The initial house price increase in 2001 is then even smaller and followed by
a gradual decrease, due to the anticipated real rate increase (and house price
decrease) in the year 2006. In the data, however, house prices increased strongly
after the year 2001.
We can conclude that under RE it is difficult to account for the U.S. house
price dynamics using the observed interest rate dynamics. Rather than pre-
dicting house price increases over the years 2001-2006, RE predicts that house
prices move together with interest rates, that fluctuations are fairly small and
that house price persistence is relatively low.
6 Specifying Near Rational Beliefs
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, agents are assumed to know that
the joint distribution over exogenous shocks and market prices has a singularity
25Since ξt = ξ, the price-to-rent ratio is simply proportional to the real house price series.´
26The intuition for this outcome should become clear from the linear-approximate solution
derived in section 5.2.
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and where exactly this singularity is located.27 Yet, even expert economists
rarely agree on the correct economic model linking fundamentals to prices. For
this reason it appears of interest to consider agents that face similar doubts and
to relax the assumption that agents know the correct model of price behavior.
We shall assume that agents express uncertainty about the true price process
by formulating a perceived joint distribution P over prices and fundamentals.
This joint distribution P does not necessarily have to incorporate a singularity
linking house prices to the history of fundaments. Below we construct a specific
measure P deviating from RE beliefs along exactly this dimension. Section 6.1
then shows how one can impose further restrictions that insure that the model
outcomes generated by P are indeed close to the beliefs entertained by agents.
And section 6.2 shows that our specification for P is consistent with the behavior
of house prices in the data.
We define the probability space (B,Ω) as in section 4.1. And to simplify the
analysis we assume that agents have correct beliefs about all variables except
for house prices, i.e., agents hold rational expectations about the exogenous
processes {yt, ξt}∞t=0 and about {pt = δ−1}∞t=0.28 We relax, however, the as-
sumption that agents believe that average house price growth is equal to zero
at all times, as is implied by the approximate REE outcome (24). Instead,
we consider agents who believe that the process for house price growth evolves
according to
ln
qt
qt−1
= lnβt + ln vt (25)
where βt denotes a time-varying persistent component and vt a transitory com-
ponent. This relaxation of beliefs relative to the REE outcome (24) is motivated
by the empirical evidence on house price behavior, which displays periods of
persistently increasing prices (lnβt > 0 for a number of periods) and periods of
persistently falling prices (lnβt < 0 for a number of periods).
For simplicity, we shall assume that the persistent component follows a ran-
dom walk 29
lnβt = lnβt−1 + ln ηt (26)
and that the innovations are given byµ
ln vt
ln ηt
¶
∼ iiN
µµ
0
0
¶
,
µ
σ2v 0
0 σ2η
¶¶
(27)
Agents’ prior beliefs about the persistent component at time zero is assumed
normal with
lnβ0 ∼ N(lnm0, σ20) (28)
27This holds true even in a Bayesian Rational Expectations Equilibrium in which agents
learn about fundamentals, see Adam and Marcet (2011) for details.
28 Since the process for yt and ξt are exogenous to the model, it is straightforward to relax
this assumption for these variables.
29The fact that βt is non-stationary is not important for our results. The model outcome
are almost the same when specifying instead a stationary process
lnβt = (1− ρ) + ρ lnβt−1 + ln ηt
and choosing some value ρ < 1 that is sufficiently close to one.
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and σ20 denoting the steady state (Kalman filter) uncertainty, i.e.,
σ20 =
−σ2η +
q¡
σ2η
¢2
+ 4σ2νσ2η
2
The prior beliefs (28) together with the process (25)-(27) completely specify
agents’ beliefs P about house price behavior.
The present setting gives rise to a learning problem because agents observe
the realized house price growth rates qtqt−1 , but do not separately observe the
persistent component βt and the transitory component vt. This requires that
agents optimally update their beliefs about βt in the light of new house price
growth observations.
We complete the overall description of P by assuming that agents know how
to map a history of prices into profits. In other words, agents know that profits
in t are given by a function π(EPt−1qt, qt) equal to the right-hand side of equation
(8) for pt = δ−1.
6.1 Insuring Near Rationality of Beliefs
In this section we impose further restrictions on the beliefs P of agents to insure
that these beliefs are close (in distribution) to the outcomes generated by the
model. We thereby proceed as follows. First, we show how to impose restrictions
on P so that these beliefs approach (in distribution) the beliefs entertained by
agents in the linearized REE (24) for any given finite amount of time.30 Second,
as agents’ beliefs converge to the REE beliefs, model outcomes equally converge
to the REE outcomes (in distribution) because equilibrium prices and quantities
are continous functions of agents’ beliefs. Since beliefs and model outcomes both
converge (in distribution) to the linearized REE outcome (24), agents’ beliefs
will be approximately validated by the model behavior.
To insure that the beliefs P are close (in distribution) to the REE beliefs
we proceed a follows. First, we center initial beliefs so as to be consistent with
the average growth rate of prices in the REE (24), i.e., we choose m0 = 1.
Agents thus initially believe that there is no growth in real house prices on
average. Second, we consider the case where the innovation variance of the
persistent house price component vanishes, i.e., σ2η → 0. As a result of this
second assumption, prior uncertainty σ0 about initial price growth also vanishes
(σ20 → 0). Agents’ prior beliefs thus become increasingly concentrated at the
point βt = 1. Formally, as σ20 → 0 agents’ beliefs about prices converge to the
REE beliefs (24) in distribution (or ‘in law’).31
This shows that for sufficiently small values of σ2η, house price beliefs are
indeed close to the model implied beliefs. In our empirical application, we
shall consider small but positive values for σ2η. Section 10 then shows that
30Convergence can only occur for an arbitrarily large but finite horizon because of the unit
root present in agents’ beliefs.
31Again, this holds only for any arbitrarily large but finite horizon.
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agents would hardly be able to reject their belief specification for the empirically
calibrated value of σ2η.
6.2 Agents’ Beliefs and House Price Behavior in the Data
This section shows that the belief specification (25)-(26) is also consistent with
the behavior of actual house prices in the data. Specifically, we derive testable
implications from our belief specification and evaluate to what extent these are
consistent with the behavior of the G7 house price data.
The belief equations (25)-(26) imply that ln qtqt−1 has a unit root and that
∆ ln qtqt−1 is an MA(1) process of the form
∆ ln
qt
qt−1
= ln ηt + ln vt − ln vt−1 (29)
Conditional on all the shocks being normally distributed, the fact that ∆ ln qtqt−1
is an MA(1) process exhausts the empirical implications of the agents’ model
(25)-(27).32
One might be tempted to test (29) using an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test with a number of lags to capture the fact that ∆ ln qtqt−1 is serially correlated
under the null hypothesis. This approach is problematic, however, because σ2η
is small relative to σ2ν so that the autoregressive coefficients decay only very
slowly with the lag length. This would require including a very large number of
lags to have a valid ADF test, thereby greatly reducing the degrees of freedom
and the power of the test.
A more attractive approach is based on the observation that equation (29)
implies
cov
µ
∆ ln
qt
qt−1
, ln
qt−i
qt−i−1
¶
= 0 for all i = 2, 3, ...
so that one can run the regression
∆ ln
qt
qt−1
=
NX
i=2
αi ln
qt−i
qt−i−1
+ et (30)
and test the joint hypothesis that αi = 0 for i = 2, ..., N. Under the null hy-
pothesis this test is valid for any number of lags N . In addition, the hypothesis
that αi = 0 for all i > 1 is sufficient for ∆ ln qtqt−1 to be MA(1). The test thus
exhausts the empirical implications of the model (25)-(27).
Appendix C explains how we construct a test statistic W to test for the null
hypothesis αi = 0 (i = 2, ..., N) and that this statistic has a χ2 asymptotic
distribution in the case with stationary regressors. Under the agents’ model,
however, the regressors contain a small non-stationary component, so that we
use Monte-Carlo simulations to find the confidence intervals.
32This is the case because one can recover νt and ηt from the MA process and then find βt.
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Table 6 below reports the test statistic for N = 4, using data for the years
1970-2008 for each country. The 10% critical value for W is equal to 6.4.33 The
results in table 6 thus show that agents would accept their model of house price
behavior (25)-(26) in the light of the G7 house price data.34
US JAP GER FR ITA UK CAN
W statistic 3.6771 4.2934 4.1107 3.6825 5.8853 3.6530 3.7493
Table 6: Testing the Belief Specification Against the Data
6.3 Internal Rationality and Discounted Sums
It appears to be a commonly held view among academic economists that ra-
tional behavior leaves no room for independent beliefs about prices once beliefs
about fundamentals are specified. Individual rationality, so the argument goes,
implies that agents know how to formulate prices as discounted sums of future
fundamentals. Yet, as discussed in Adam and Marcet (2010), this view is gen-
erally incorrect and, as explained below, it also fails to apply for the model
studied in the present paper.
Agents with the belief system P described in the previous section fail to hold
enough knowledge to be able to formulate beliefs about prices as a function of
their beliefs about fundamentals only. This is the case despite all agents being
rational. This can be most easily demonstrated for the case where the non-
negativity constraint on consumption is never binding, so that equation (14)
holds each period. Forward iteration on this equation then yields a discounted
sum formulation for the house price
qt = EPt
∞X
j=0
ρjξt+jG
0(Ht+j) (31)
which holds under internal rationality. Importantly, this discounted sum in-
volves beliefs about future housing decisions (Ht+j), in addition to beliefs about
future fundamentals (ξt+j). The agent’s optimal plan for future Ht+j , however,
is a function of the agent’s beliefs about future house prices, so that beliefs
about future prices still enter the discounted sum (31). Moreover, since the
belief system P fails to incorporate a singularity linking the future house price
33The 10% critial value reported in the text assumes a gain parameter of g = 0.06, which is
the value that we estimate for our model later on. The critical value, however, changes very
little over a wide range of values for g.
34An alternative test is based on using lags of the price over rent ratio on the right side
of the regression (30), which leads to very similar findings. Rent prices, however, are not
available for Italy prior to 1996 in our OECD dataset.
25
to the history of fundamentals, one cannot replace beliefs about future house
prices by beliefs about fundamentals only. The agent’s price beliefs are thus
required to determine the discounted sum (31), while the agent’s beliefs about
fundamentals are insufficient.
7 Equilibrium Dynamics with Learning
We now explore the equilibrium dynamics in an economy in which agents hold
the near-REE beliefs P specified in the previous section. We first derive the
evolution of the conditional house price growth expectations mt implied by the
probability measure P, then discuss the resulting price dynamics
7.1 Belief Updating
Bayesian updating of beliefs implies that agents’ posterior beliefs about βt at
time t are given by
lnβt ∼ N(lnmt, σ20)
where lnmt evolves recursively according to
lnmt = lnmt−1 + g
µ
ln
qt
qt−1
− lnmt−1
¶
(32)
with the ‘gain’ parameter given by
g =
σ20
σ2ν
> 0
Agents’ conditional expectations of house price growth are then given by
EPt
qt+1
qt
= mte
1
2(σ
2
0+σ
2
η+σ
2
ν) ≈ mt
withmt evolving according to equation (32). Furthermore, to avoid simultaneity
between price expectations and price outcomes, it is convenient to assume that
information on prices is introduced with a delay in mt, so that we actually use
lnmt = lnmt−1 + g
µ
ln
qt−1
qt−2
− lnmt−1
¶
(33)
A microfounded belief system justifying this delay is provided in proposition 2
in Adam and Marcet (2010).
7.2 Qualitative Behavior of EquilibriumPrices under Learn-
ing
This section discusses the qualitative behavior of equilibrium house prices under
learning. To simplify the discussion we consider the approximate solution when
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linearizing G around its steady state value, so that take G0 is constant. The
asset pricing equation (19) then implies that the equilibrium asset price under
learning is (approximately) given by
qt =
ξt G0(Hss)
1− ρmt
(34)
so that realized log house price growth is
ln
qt
qt−1
= ln
1− ρmt−1
1− ρmt
+ ln εt (35)
For the case with vanishing prior uncertainty (σ2η, σ
2
0 → 0), the gain g is small
so that mt changes only slowly from period to period. Beliefs then remain close
to mt = 1 for all t in the sample and the above price is well defined because
ρ < 1.
The key feature of house prices under learning is that there is feedback
between expectations of price growth and actual price growth. Equation (34)
shows that higher expected growth mt leads to higher price and thus higher
realized price growth, which in turn increases the expectations tomorrow via the
belief updating rule (32). Therefore, the model has the potential to generate
price booms that are fueled by the interaction between expectations and realized
prices.
This can formally be shown by combining (35) and (33) to obtain a non-linear
second order difference equation governing the behavior of mt. The dynamics
of this difference equation are very similar to those described in section 4.2.1
of Adam, Marcet and Nicolini (2010) for stock prices. They show that price
changes display momentum locally around the REE value, i.e., once prices start
growing (falling), there is a tendency for prices to continue growing (falling), as
well as there being mean reversion in the longer-run.
Within the linearized system, house price increases will come to an end when
realized house price growth falls short of the expected price growth. Equation
(35) shows that this occurs whenever the increase in price growth optimism
becomes too weak to sustain the high level of price growth expectations. For
example, if mt is very high, but stays constant from one period to the next
(mt = mt−1), then equation (35) implies that realized price growth is equal to
1 on average, i.e., falls short of expectations.
More generally, the upward price dynamics can come to an end for a number
of additional reasons. For example, if there is an increase in real interest rates
that causes house prices to increase less than initially expected, or if a nega-
tive shock to housing preferences materializes. Finally, the endogenous model
dynamics will make it difficult for sustained price increases to continue forever,
especially in the more general case with a concave G function. Upward price
dynamics and the associated expansion of the housing stock then lead to a fall
in G0 and thereby to a fall in the asset price.
Once price growth realizations fall short of agents’ expectations, this sets
in motion a sequence of downward belief revisions. Following the initial dis-
appointment, there will be a decrease in price growth expectations, thereby a
27
further fall in realized house price growth, i.e., a sequence of downward belief
revisions and a price bust. The model thus has the potential to generate a house
price boom which eventually will leads to a bust.
7.3 The Qualitative Response to Interest Rates Changes
We now explore the effects of an unanticipated decrease in real interest rates in
period t.35 Equation (35) implies that realized house price growth in period t
increases as a result of a reduction in real interest rates.36 The price increase is
thereby stronger for an economy in which agents in period t are more optimistic
about future price growth (in which mt is higher).
After a fall in real interest rates, the initial increase in realized price growth
will feed into future beliefs about price growth via the belief updating equation
(33). Due to the presence of momentum this leads to a sequence of further
increases in realized price growth.
Key to explaining the real house price data shown in figure 5, however, is
the fact that interest rates are not the only determinant of whether or not a
price boom occurs. If the house price in a given country has been increasing
already before the reduction in interest rates, then the interest rate reduction
will make it more likely that the house price boom will continue in this country.
Conversely, in a country where house prices have been decreasing, the interest
rate reduction may only ameliorate the decrease in house prices. Therefore,
the model is consistent with the observation that house price booms are not
synchronized across countries, even though interest rates behave in a similar
way.
A house price boom also relaxes the collateral constraint and leads to an
increase in total borrowing, which is given by
bt =
θqtmt
R
Ht
House price increases are thus associated with increased international borrowing,
i.e., a current account deficit. Provided investment in new houses is not too
elastic, the house price boom will also be associated with a consumption boom.
Finally, from equation (6) follows that an increase in expected house price
growth leads to an increase in the production of new houses, thereby qualita-
tively matching the observation about new housing supply displayed in figure
4. Admittedly, the model cannot reproduce the asymmetric and sharp decline
in new housing construction after the year 2006. Given the simplicity of the
model, however, this should be hardly surprising.
Qualitatively, the previous findings show that the model has the potential
to explain a housing boom, that is associated with a current account deficit, a
consumption increase and an increase in the production of new housing units.
The next sections explore the ability of the learning model to quantitatively
35Technically, the change in the real interest rate is a probability zero event under the
postulated beliefs.
36The interest rate enters in the definition of ρ, see equation (15)
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account for the real house price and current account dynamics in the U.S. and
the remaining G7 economies.
8 The U.S. Experience: 2001-2008
We now calibrate the learning model to the U.S. economy and show that it
can quantitatively replicate the real house price and current account develop-
ments for the U.S. economy over the years 2001-2008. The performance for the
remaining G7 economies is analyzed in the next section.
We use as data inputs the history of real house prices over the years 1996-
2000 and the stylized path for real interest rates of the years 2001-2008, as
captured by the dashed line in figure 2.37 Except for the stylized information
about the real interest rate, the predictions we show below do not use any data
after the year 2000.
As in section 5.4, we choose θ = 0.26, δ = 0.96 and d = 3%. The gain
parameter g in the belief updating equation (33) and second derivative G00 are
chosen to minimize the distance between the model implied prediction for the
real house price and the data, we will be more precise about this step in section 9
below. This leads to a annual gain of g = 0.06, which implies that agents believe
that on average 94% of any observed annual house price increase is transitory
in nature.
We set the initial price growth expectations in 1996 as if the model had
been in REE for a very long time, i.e., we choose m1996 = 1. We then use the
belief updating equation (33) from the model and the real house price growth
observation from the U.S. data for the years 1996 to 2000 to impute house price
beliefs for the year 2000 (m2000). We then use m2000 and the real interest rate
R1996−2000 to compute the equilibrium real house price for the year 2000. We
thereby normalize the equilibrium real house price in the year 2000 to 100 by
choosing the value of ξG0(H) correspondingly.38 We then use the model to
predict the real house price for the years 2001-2008, using as inputs only the
interest rate decrease for the years 2001-2005 and the increase for the years
2006-2008.
Figure 7 reports the model-predicted outcome jointly with the U.S. real
house price series for the years 2000-2008. The model shows that the decrease
in real interest rates in the year 2001 gives rise to an initial increase in the real
house price. Since realized price increases feed positively into future beliefs via
the updating equation, the initial increase will be followed by further upward
price movements, giving rise to a house price boom. The increase comes to
37Specifically, for the years 1996-2000 we set real interest rates equal to the average ex-ante
gross real mortgage rate, i.e., R96−00 = 1.0335. To capture the real interest rate decrease
following in years 2001-2005, we set real interest to R01−05 = 1.0228, which is again the
average ex-ante U.S. real mortgage rate for this period in the data. Finally, we capture the
upward shift in real rates in the years 2006-2008 by setting R06−08 = 1.0301, which is again
taken from the data.
38We keep ξG0(H) fixed at this calibrated value in all subsequent model periods. The value
for ξG0(H) only normalizes the house price level, but has no impact on the dynamics.
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Figure 7: US Real House Prices: Model Predictions, Data and Counterfactual
an end in the year 2006 when interest rates move up again, causing the house
price to slowly revert direction, in line with the data. The resulting downward
revision in beliefs then sets in motion a sequence of price reductions.
Figure 7 also depicts the model predicted counterfactual house price path
that would be obtained if real interest rates in the years 2001-2008 remained
at their pre 2001 average.39 House prices would then have increased only very
mildly. A small increase would have occurred nevertheless, simply because of
the positive price momentum that existed already prior to the year 2000. The
model is thus consistent with the view that the US housing price boom was
mostly caused by interest rates being too low for too long.
The current account dynamics implied by the housing boom in figure 7 de-
pend partly on the long-run housing supply elasticity ( α1−α), because housing
can be used as collateral in international borrowing. For their preferred specifi-
cation, Topel and Sherwin (1988) estimate a long-run housing supply elasticity
of 3 for the United States. Since there is considerable uncertainty about this
parameter, we allow for values between 1 and 5 and choose the long-run elas-
ticity that best fits the data, we will be more precise about this below.40 The
model then prefers a relative elastic supply with α1−α = 5. Figure 8 depicts
the current account ratio in the data and the one implied by the model. The
39Gross ex-ante real interest rates are then assumed to stay constant at their 1996-2000
average, which is R96−00 = 1.0335.
40To obtain a model-implied current account to GDP ratio, one also has to take a stand on
the exogenous income process. We choose a time-invariant income, i.e., yt = y so as to match
the data.
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Figure 8: US Current Account Deficit Ratio: Model Predicted and Data
model predicts well the deterioration of the U.S. current account over the years
2001-2005, but overpredicts the improvements following the house price collapse
after 2005. Overall, the quantitative performance of the model is surprisingly
good, given that it abstracts from so many other factors known to be relevant
for the current account, for example, public borrowing.
Figure 8 also depicts the counterfactual reaction of the current account if
real interest rate had stayed at their 1996-2000 average. The model predicts
that large part of the current account deficits would have been eliminated, had
interest rates not decreased after the year 2000. This is the result of a lower
volume of collateral and a lower collateral value in the absence of a price and
construction boom.
9 Other G7 Economies: 2001-2008
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the real house price
and current dynamics over the years 2001-2008 in the remaining G7 economies
and we describe in detail the calibration procedure for the parameters g,G00, α, y.
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Figure 9: Other G7 Economies: Model Predicted Real House Prices and Real
House Price Data
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9.1 Real House Price Dynamics
We tie our hands by using the same model parameters for all G7 countries.41
We also subject each of the G7 economies to the same stylized interest rate path
as the U.S. economy, which amounts to interpreting the U.S. real mortgage rate
as a proxy for international real interest rates. Clearly, this approach biases
results against us, as we could instead choose to parameterize the model for
each country to achieve a better fit with the data. As we show below, the model
nevertheless performs surprisingly well.
It is important to note that countries differ because of the method for finding
initial beliefs m2000, so that the different country-specific house price histories
over the years 1996-2000 lead to different imputed beliefs in the year 2000.
In order to obtain the parameters g,G00, α we proceed as follows. We first
obtain (g,G00) by minimizing the square deviations between model and actual
data. More precisely, letting boldface letters denote actual data, we choose
(g,G00) to minimize
6X
i=1
2008X
t=2000
¡
qit − qit
¢2
where qit is the model implied house price in country i and period t for a given
value of parameters. We exclude the UK from this computation, as our ex-
perience is that for the value of g that is chosen by this procedure the UK
generates an explosive path for prices. Proceeding in this way we obtain the
values g = 0.06 and G00 = 0, as mentioned in the previous section. The best
match with the data is thus achieved for a linear G function. Yet, to keep our
analysis within a well specified model, we impose a minimal amount of curva-
ture by setting ξG00/G0 = −0.007.42 Next, we determine separately the optimal
value for g for the UK, which turns out to be g = 0.046.
The outcome from simulating the economy with these parameters is depicted
in figure 9. It shows that our model predicts strong house price increases for
France, Italy, and the U.K., in line with the empirical evidence. The model
predicts considerably weaker price increases for Germany and Japan than for the
countries mentioned above, albeit it fails to replicate the observed fall in house
prices. Since real house prices in Germany and Japan have been falling prior to
the year 2000, the presence of momentum in house price changes implies that
agents’ price growth expectations tend to decrease further. Yet, the interest rate
reduction turns this negative momentum into some slight positive momentum.
For Canada the model predicts a house price boom, but underpredicts its size,
especially at the end of the sample period.
Table 7 below reports for each year the cross-country correlation between the
model-predicted real house price and the real house price in the data. The table
shows that this correlation is very high throughout. The model thus accounts
41This is true, except for the value of ξG0, which is chosen in each country to normalize the
model-implied real house prices in the year 2000 to 100.
42The performance of the model deteriorates only slightly, but concavity is required to have
an independent role for price beliefs, as explained in section 6.3.
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surprisingly well for the asynchronous low frequency movements in house prices,
despite the fact that we subject all economies to the same interest rate shocks
and use a very parsimonious parameterization.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
House Price 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.76
Table 7: Yearly Cross-Sectional Correlation Between Model Predicted and
Actual Real House Price for the G7
9.2 Current Account Dynamics
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the current ac-
count dynamics for the remaining G7 economies. Using the values of (g,G00)
determined in the previous section, we choose the value of the long-run housing
supply elasticity α/ (1− α) that best fits the observed current account dynamics
across countries and periods. We thereby use a an analogous objective function
as in the case when matching the house price dynamics. We restrict the search
to supply elasticities in the interval α/1 − α ∈ [1, 5] to be consistent with the
findings in Topel and Sherwin (1988), as discussed in section 8. Our procedure
then chooses the highest admissible value in this interval.
The model is clearly not well suited to explain the level of the current account
in all countries. Since the discount factor of domestic households falls short of
R−1, all countries will want to be borrowers on average, while some countries,
e.g., Germany and Japan, are known to have persistent surpluses and also to
have accumulated positive net foreign asset positions. Given this, we explore
the ability of the model to explain the cyclical movements across time and the
overall improvement or worsening of the current account during the studied
period.
Table 8 below reports the annual correlation across countries, between the
model-implied current account to GDP ratio and the actual current account to
GDP ratio, where output y in the model is chosen to be time-invariant and equal
to ten times the steady state housing output. As is apparent from the table,
the model is able to capture a sizeable part of the current account fluctuations
across countries.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CA/GDP ratio 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.49 0.30
Table 8: Yearly Cross-Sectional Correlation Between Model Predicted and
Actual Current Account/GDP Ratio for the G7
As a further check, we determine the model-implied correlation (across coun-
tries) between the total accumulated current account deficit over the period
2000-2007 and house price growth over the same period. In the model this
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correlation equals to -0.98. In the data this correlation is of the same sign
but achieves a lower value of around -.5, depending on the precise measure for
house prices used, see table 2. The fact that the correlation is much higher in the
model than in the data arguably reflects the fact that other model-omitted fac-
tors have influenced the current account behavior in the data. Introducing such
additional factors into the model would most likely reduce the model implied
correlation.
10 Testing the Model Consistency of Beliefs
This section discusses whether agents in our calibrated model could easily detect
that they are using a wrong model to forecast house prices. While outcomes
and beliefs are close to each other (in distribution) when σ2η is sufficiently small,
it remains to check that this is indeed the case for the values of σ2η implied by
the calibrated gain parameter g = 0.06.
We address this issue by assuming that agents apply an econometric test to
the data generated by their model (25)-(26) of price behavior.43 Specifically,
we compute the probability that agents would reject their model of house price
behavior using the W test-statistic proposed in section 6.2, which is based on
the regression (30). We thereby assume that agents run this test using data for
the years 2000-2008 and compute the probability that the model will be rejected
when ξ follows a unit root with the estimated standard deviation of σε = 0.0115,
which is obtained from data on rental prices. We use 50000 replications of the
model under learning with the calibrated parameter values. Table 9 below
reports the probability of rejecting the agents’ beliefs when testing at the 1%,
5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The test uses data generated by the
model and confidence intervals for the W statistic obtained from Monte-Carlo
simulation for a sample length of 8 model periods (corresponding to the years
2001-2008).
Table 9 shows that the probability of rejecting the model is fairly close to
the actual confidence level. Clearly, under rational expectations, the rejection
probabilities would exactly equal the corresponding confidence levels. The table
thus shows that our learning agents reject their forecasting model with very
similar likelihood as agents holding rational expectations who also test their
forecasting model.
Confidence level 1% 5% 10%
Probability of rejecting 0.0106 0.0573 0.1251
Table 9: Testing belief specification with W statistic
on data generated by the learning model
43A similar approach has been used in models of learning, see Bray and Savin (1986) for an
early reference.
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11 Conclusions
A simple model of learning can quantitatively account for the G7 house price
developments over the recent housing boom and bust period. The model also
explains a sizable portion of the cross-sectional dispersion of the G7 current
accounts and the correlation between the current account and house prices over
time.
The model predicts that a persistent fall in the level of the real interest rate
can fuel a persistent and long lasting increase in real house prices. Whether or
not such a boom materializes depends crucially on the degree to which agents
expect future capital gains already, i.e., on the past price dynamics and shocks
hitting the economy.
The model suggests that house price booms can give rise to important wel-
fare distortions because they lead to an over-extension of the housing stock.
It thus appears of interest to explore to what extent policy instruments, e.g.,
adjustments in the permissible leverage ratio or real interest rates can usefully
prevent an excessive build-up of the housing stock. The welfare effects of a house
price boom thereby depend not only on the size and duration of the house price
increase, but also on the underlying elasticity of housing supply.
A Non-negativity constraints on consumption
We now determine the behavior of the model when the non-negativity con-
straints on consumption are binding.
Since δR < 1 it is immediate that c0 is high and b0 is against the borrowing
limit as long as the limit is tight enough.
In the main text we supposed that the collateral constraint is binding in all
periods. As we show now, this could lead to a violation of the non-negativity
constraint on consumption whenever income yt is not high enough. Consider,
for example, a case when EPj qj+1Hj has large fluctuations, it is very high at
j = t and very low at j = t + 1. If borrowing is at the collateral limit in both
periods, then this implies a large decrease in debt at t+1. And if income yt+1 is
not high enough, this would require negative consumption in t+1. The optimal
solution then cannot have the feature that the collateral constraint is binding
periods t and t+ 1 simultaneously.
In such a situation one can determine the optimal solution as follows. Con-
jecture that the non-negativity constraint on consumption is binding only in
period t + 1 but not binding in period t, so that we have γt = 0. From the
non-binding zero limit in t we have λt = 1 and from (12) we obtain λt+1 > 1,
as δR < 1, so that indeed ct+1 = 0. The binding borrowing constraint at t+ 1
then determines bt+1. Using this and the fact that ct+1 = 0 one obtains bt from
the budget constraint at t + 1. The value for ct then follows from the budget
constraint at t. Moreover, since γt+1 > 0 we can have (12) holding and λt+2 = 1
so that μt+2 = 0 and ct+2 > 0, so that from t + 2 onwards we are back in the
case analyzed in the main text where consumption is positive and the collateral
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constraint is binding.
If the previous solution would still imply negative consumption in t, then
one would have to extend the approach to a setting where consumption is zero
for more than one period, say between periods t+ 1,... , t+ n. In this case we
would have that the collateral constraint being non-binding for n periods, i.e.,
for periods t, ..., t+ n− 1 and one could work backwards to derive a candidate
solution in the same manner as described above. Again, after period t+ n one
would be back in the setting analyzed in the main text.
Therefore, if EPj qj+1Hj is anticipated to be very low in the next period, to-
day’s borrowing limit is not binding. All that is required to have an equilibrium
where the borrowing limit is always binding is that fluctuations in EPj qj+1Hj
are not large and that the parameter θ is sufficiently low.
B Details for the Linear-Quadratic Approxima-
tion
The main text derives equilibrium quantities under the linear approximation to
G. We now extend the analysis to a quadratic approximation of G(·). Besides
increasing the order of the approximation, this is of interest because it introduces
an interaction between housing prices and the level of housing construction.
Considering concavity in G(·) is also useful because it makes it less likely that
explosive paths for prices will arise under learning: as house prices and new
construction increases, the marginal value of housing services G0(Ht) decreases,
which exerts a dampening effect on the upward prices dynamics under learning.
We show below that the unique locally non-explosive rational expectations
(RE) solution then takes the form
bqt = aREbξt + bRE bHtbHt+1 = cRE bHt + dREbξt
where hatted variables denote deviations from the steady state and
¡
aRE, bRE, cRE, dRE
¢
are given coefficients satisfying aRE > 0, bRE < 0, 0 < cRE < 1 and dRE > 0.
We now derive a first order accurate approximation to the rational expecta-
tions (RE) solution of the equation system
qt =
µ
θ
R
+ (1− d− θ)δ
¶
EPt qt+1 + ξtG
0(Ht) (36)
Ht+1 = (1− d)Ht + S(EPt qt+1, δ−1) (37)
We linearize these equations around some steady state (q,H, ξ), i.e., around a
point solving the above system of equation for qt = q,Ht = H and ξt = ξ for all
t. Letting hatted variables again denote deviations from steady state values, a
first order approximation to (36) delivers
bqt = ρEPt bqt+1 +G0bξt + ξG00 bHt (38)
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where, as in the text, ρ =
¡ θ
R + (1− d− θ)δ
¢
and with all derivatives evaluated
at the steady state. A linearization of (37) deliversbHt+1 = (1− d) bHt + S0EPt qt+1 (39)
We now conjecture a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
bqt = abξt + b bHt
With RE and using the law of motion for ξt we have
Etbqt+1 = abξt + bEt bHt+1 (40)
Substituting into (39) deliversbHt+1 = (1− d) bHt + S0(abξt + bEt bHt+1)
Taking the expectations Et of this equation delivers
Et bHt+1 = (1− d)
(1− S0b)
bHt + S0a
(1− S0b)
bξt (41)
so that (40) implies
Etbqt+1 = abξt + (1− d)b(1− S0b) bHt + S0ab(1− S0b)bξt (42)
Substituting this into (38) delivers the actual law of motion (ALM)
bqt = µρa+ ρ S0ab
(1− S0b) +G
0
¶bξt +µρ (1− d)b(1− S0b) + ξG00
¶ bHt
Equation coefficients in the ALM and PLM delivers two conditions for aRE and
bRE given by
aRE = ρaRE + ρ
S0aREbRE
1− S0bRE +G
0
bRE = ρ
(1− d)bRE
1− S0bRE + ξG
00
The second equation depends only on bRE but is quadratic, the first is linear in
aRE, conditional on bRE.
0 = S0
¡
bRE
¢2
+ (−1 + ρ(1− d)− S0ξG00) bRE + ξG00
which has two solutions
b∗1 =
(1− ρ(1− d) + S0ξG00) +
q
(−1 + ρ(1− d)− S0ξG00)2 − 4S0ξG00
2S0
b∗2 =
(1− ρ(1− d) + S0ξG00)−
q
(−1 + ρ(1− d)− S0ξG00)2 − 4S0ξG00
2S0
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The corresponding solution for a is
a∗i =
G0
1− ρ1−S0b∗i
(43)
From (39) and (42) follows that the dynamics for bHt are given by
bHt+1 = (1− d) bHt + S0EPt qt+1
= (1− d) bHt + S0µa∗ibξt + (1− d)b∗i(1− S0b∗i ) bHt + S
0a∗i b
∗
i
(1− S0b∗i )
bξt¶
=
1− d
1− S0b∗i
bHt + S0a∗i
1− S0b∗i
bξt (44)
Since 1 > d > 0, we have that S0b∗i < 0 is a sufficient condition for the dynamics
for bHt to be locally non-explosive. It is easy to show that the solution (a∗2, b∗2)
is non-explosive while (a∗1, b∗1) implies locally explosive dynamics. Therefore,¡
aRE, bRE
¢
= (a∗2, b∗2) and bRE < 0. The values for
¡
cRE, dRE
¢
follow from
equation (44). As we show in the next section, show there exists no other
locally non-explosive RE equilibrium.
B.1 Local Uniqueness of the RE Solution
We now show that there exists no other locally non-explosive RE solution than
the one derived in the previous section. We bring the linearized equation (39)
and (38) in vector notation:µ
1 −S0
0 ρ
¶µ bHt+1
EPt bqt+1
¶
=
µ
1− d 0
−ξG00 1
¶µ bHtbqt
¶
+
µ
0
−G0
¶
ξt
Inverting the matrix on the left, which is always invertible, we getµ bHt+1
EPt bqt+1
¶
=
Ã
1− ξρG00S0 − d
1
ρS
0
− ξρG00
1
ρ
!µ bHtbqt
¶
+
µ − 1ρG0S0
− 1ρG0
¶µ
0
−G0
¶
ξt
which is a system with one predetermined and one ‘jump’ variable. It has a
locally unique REE if the first matrix on the right-hand side has one explosive
and one stable eigenvalue. The eigenvalues are
λ1 =
1
2ρ
µ
ρ− dρ− ξG00S0 + 1 +
q
(ρ− dρ− ξG00S0 + 1)2 + 4ρ (d− 1)
¶
λ2 =
1
2ρ
µ
ρ− dρ− ξG00S0 + 1−
q
(ρ− dρ− ξG00S0 + 1)2 + 4ρ (d− 1)
¶
It is straightforward to show that λ1 is unstable (λ1 > 1) while λ2 is a stable
eigenvalue (−1 < λ2 < 1).
39
C Test of Agents’ Model
This appendix shows how to design a test statistic for equation (30). Following
standard practice in the unit-root literature, the statistic is such that it would
be efficient within a certain class of estimators in the stationary case. Consider
a version of equation (30)
∆ ln
qt
qt−1
= α0xt + et (45)
where xt is stationary and ergodic, orthogonal to et, and ∆ ln qtqt−1 is MA(1).
Let αOLST be the OLS estimator with a sample of T observations. We define the
test statistic
WT ≡ αOLS0T
£
(X 0X)−1Sw,T (X 0X)−1
¤−1
αOLST
where
X = [x1, ..., xT ]
0
Sw,T =
TX
t=1
µ
∆ log
qt
qt−1
¶2
xtx0t +
T
T − 1
TX
t=2
µ
∆ log
qt
qt−1
¶µ
∆ log
qt−1
qt−2
¶
xtx0t−1
+
T
T − 1
T−1X
t=1
µ
∆ log
qt
qt−1
¶µ
∆ log
qt+1
qt
¶
xtx0t+1
Clearly 1T Sw,T is a consistent estimator of the spectral density evaluated at
frequency zero when et is MA(1) and independent of xt.
Using standard results it can be shown that under the null hypothesis (α = 0)
we have
WT → χ23 in distribution as T →∞
Clearly, this asymptotic result cannot be applied to testing equation (30),
since the regressors in (30) are non-stationary. We therefore derive correct
confidence intervals for WT by Monte-Carlo simulation for a given sample size
T and given parameter values (the confidence intervals turn out not to be very
different from those of a χ2 distribution). The set of parameters consists only
of the variances σ2η and σ2v, so that it is easy to test for the sensitivity of the
confidence intervals. We find that the main results would be non-altered for a
wide range of values for these variances.
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